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NOTES AND COMMENTS

due at the time of the life tenant's death; but, where the life estate
terminates before the rent is due, an apportionment is in order.30
The Virginia statute allows the lessee to remain on the land until
the end of the year and apportions the rent to the representative of the
life tenant and the remainderman. If the rent is payable in kind, however, it is to be paid to the personal representative; and he, in turn, is
required to pay a reasonable money rent to the remainderman for the
period between the death of the life tenant and the end of the current
year. This sum is a preferred charge on the rent in kind received from
the lessee by the personal representative.3 1 The provision concerning
the payment of a reasonable rent to the remainderman affirms the holding of the Virginia court in an early case, decided under the common
32
law, that such a sum could be recovered by the remainderman.
Generally, it may be said that these statutes effectively take care of
the situation here presented. The injustices of the common law have
been eradicated, and the rights of the parties marked out and clarified.
Perhaps the term "emblements," when used in these laws, should be
given a more definite and positive definition. Nothing so important as
the principle of apportionment should be left to judicial interpretation,
as was done by the Georgia legislators. All states which o not have
such statutes should be urged to adopt laws similar to those discussed
herein and draft them with a view to clarity and effectiveness.
CHA.LES S. MANGUM, JR.

Chapel Hill, N. C.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--Commencement of an Action for
Purposes of the Statute of Limitations-Amendment of Complaints
In a recent case 1 before the Circuit Court of Appeals the executor
of a deceased partner sued the surviving members of the partnership
for an accounting of the deceased's interest in proceeds from the sale
of certain jointly owned cattle, the alleged conversion occurring April 1,
1938. The original petition was filed March 8, 1940, but both summons
and alias summons were returned unserved because plaintiff's counsel
failed to advance the marshal's fees. Upon issue of another alias summons defendant was served more than sixty days after the four-year
statute of limitations had run out. On August 3 and December 11,
1942, amended petitions were filed centering around the same transaction alleged in the original petition, but differing from the original
in that plaintiff sought accounting of a single defendant. The court
0Ar.A. CODE (1940) tit. 31 §14. The Arkansas and Mississippi statutes resenble the Alabama law closely. See ARK. DiG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §8579 and
Miss. CoDE ANt. (1942) §§2179-80.
"' VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett, & Stedman, 1942) §5543.
" Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Munf. 514 (Va. 1820).

'Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
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held: (1) the running of the statute was interrupted by the filing of
the petition, 2* and (2) the amended petitions related back to the filing
of the original.3* The dissenting judge argued that the mere filing of
the petition within the four year period without diligent service of
process was not sufficient.
Before the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4
an action was deemed to be commenced in a Federal equity court by
the filing of a bill with a bona fide intent to prosecute the suit diligently,
provided there was no detrimental or unreasonable delay in the issuance or service of process. 5 To stay the statute of limitations there
must also have been a bona fide attempt to serve the process after it had
come into the hands of the serving officer, 8 which, if unsuccessful, was
required to be followed by timely proceedings or reasonable diligence
to procure service through further or additional process.7 As late as
January, 1938, the above proposition was expounded as the rule applied
by the federal courts in determining when a civil action was deemed to
be commenced.s* However, the bona fide attempt to serve did not
require that every means by which service might be accomplished
should have been exhausted; thus it was held sufficient if the officer in
good faith, or with a real intent to serve, made reasonable effort to
accomplish his purpose9* But the bona fides require the effort to proceed according to law, and that the means prescribed thereby be employed.lo*
Since the new Federal Rules have become effective-September
'*28 U. S. C. A. §723c (1941), Rule 3: "A civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint
with the court."
3
*Id. Rule 15(c): "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arouse out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth .. .in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading."
' 28 U. S. C. A. §723c (1941).
'Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S. 574, 35 Sup. Ct. 440, 59 L. ed.
725 (1915); U. S. v. Hardy et al., 74 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Ben
C. Jones & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 270 Fed. 563 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921), writ dismissed, Ben C. Jones & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 270 U. S.665, 46 Sup. Ct. 208, 70
L. ed. 789 (1925) (There must be a bona fide intention that the process be served
at once.); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants Refrigerating Co., 184 Fed. 199
(C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
U. S. v. Amer. Lum. Co., 85 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 9th, 1898).
7U. S. v. Miller et al., 164 Fed. 444 (C. C. D. Ore. 1908).
8* U. S. v. Adams et al., 92 F (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (The filing of
the complaint to be effectual as the commencement of suit must have been with
good faith intent to prosecute it, and must have been followed reasonably with the
issuance and service of process.) ; accord, N. Y., N. H., & H. R. Co. v. Pascucci,
46 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931) (Rule denoted to be uniform practice of
federal courts.).
'* U. S. v. Miller et al., 164 Fed. 444 (C. *C. D. Ore. 1908) (That the marshal
used the telephone in attempt to locate defendant, rather than going in person to
make
10 direct inquiry, cannot be assigned as a lack of diligence.).
* U. S. v. Amer. Lum. Co., 85 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 9th, 1898) (It does not
aid the bona. fides of the attempt to serve that the plaintiff's counsel erroneously
thought that the subpoenas could be served by the persons to whom they were
sent.).

1945]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

16, 1938-the courts, in applying them, have almost entirely ignored
the above stated principles. The requirement that the suit be diligently
prosecuted after the filing of the complaint seems to have been sidetracked by the simple statement of Rule 3: "A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court.""* As a consequence, the following questions have presented themselves: Since the adoption of the
rules, may a suit be deemed commenced by the mere filing of a complaint with the court for purposes of the statute of limitations? Must
there not be a bona fide effort, on the part of the plaintiff, to have
service on the defendant and to prosecute the suit diligently?
Similar questions, of the same import, were presented to the Advisory Committee, but were left unanswered, the committee being of
the opinion that the ". . . requirement of Rule 4 (a) that the clerk shall
forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the marshal for service
S. . (would) reduce the chances of such a question arising."' 2 (Italics
ours.) Upon a consideration of the committee's statement, it has been
suggested ". . . that the filing of the complaint conditionally suspends
the running of the statute of limitations, provided the summons is
issued forthwith and served within a reasonable time thereafter."' 3
(Italics ours.) Likewise, it has recently been held by a United States
District Court, while recognizing and applying the Federal Rules, that
the ". . . modem Federal rule is that an action in equity is commenced
by the filing of a complaint with a bona fide intent to prosecute the
suit diligently, provided there is no unreasonable delay in the issuance
or service of the subpoena."' 4 This proposition would seem to be
impliedly recognized in the principal case, for it was there said: "There
is nothing in the record from which a legal conclusion of lack of good
faith in the prosecution of the action ... can be inferred " and that the
plaintiff's action, or non-action, ". . . does not in itself constitute lack
of due diligence. . . .".5 It is submitted by the writer that in determining when a civil action is commenced, for purposes of the statute
of limitations, Rule 3 should be construed in the light of the rules propounded by the earlier decisions, i.e., that the filing of the complaint
. Reynolds v. Needle, 132 F. (2d) 161 (App. D. C. 1942) ; O'Leary v. Loftin,
3 F. R. D. 36 (E. D. N. Y. 1942) (No longer is a suit commenced by service of
a summons and complaint.); Schram v. Costello et al., 36 F. Supp. 525 (E. D.
Mich. 1940) (Filing a complaint with the court, the issuance of summons and delivery thereof to the marshal tolls the statute of limitations.) ; Gallagher et al.
v. Carroll et al., 27 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) (Issuance of summons is the
required ministerial act.); C. F. Simonin's Sons, Inc., v. Amer. Can Co., 26 F.
Supp. 420 (E. D. Pa. 1939) (Until the complaint has been filed, no action has
been 2 commenced.).

" Notes to the Rudes of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United

States, 75th Cong., 3d Session, House Document No. 588 (1938).
13 Rotwein, Pleading and Practice Under the New Federal Rides-A Survey
and14Comparison (1939) 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 188, 193.
U. S. v. Spreckels et al., 50 F. Supp. 789, 790 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
13 Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F. (2d) 26, 28 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
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should be followed by a bona fide attempt to have service on the defendant and to prosecute the suit with -due diligence.
In Maier v. Independent Taxi Owner's Assn.16 the statute was
held to be tolled where the complaint was filed within time, but service
was not had on defendant until after the statute had run because plaintiff's counsel failed to advance marshal's fees. The court there stated
that ".

.

. upon a proper showing that the circumstances which could

not have been reasonably foreseen delayed payment, proof of reasonable
diligence thereafter is sufficient to prevent operation of the statute."' 7.
It is interesting to note that in the Maier case the court suggested that
the obligation of delivering the summons to the marshal included prepayment of the marshal's fees:' 8 It was later held in Schram v. Koppin,19 where the complaint was filed before the statute of limitations
expired, but service on defendant was delayed until fifteen months
thereafter because the latter avoided servers, that the filing of the
complaint and the issuance of the original writ started the suit. But
the court decided, impliedly recognizing the doctrine of the Maier case,
that the equities on the question of due diligence were in favor of the
plaintiff. 20 However, where the marshal's fees were not prepaid, resulting in service after the statute had expired because plaintiff had
difficulty in finding security for such fees, it has been held that an
honest effort was made under the circumstances to procure the service
2
in due time. l*

By application of the above decisions to the case under consideration, it would seem that plaintiff made no diligent or bona fide effort
to prosecute the suit. The court merely stated on this point that the
".. . trial court evidently failed to find such conduct (lack of due diligence), because it concluded that the statute of limitations was no bar
to the prosecution of the action." 22 Indeed, not only did plaintiff's
counsel fail on two occasions to provide marshal's fees, although requested, but service was not had on defendant until more than two
696 F. (2d) 579 (App. D. C. 1938).
17

*

Id. at 582 (Plaintiff's counsel was unexpectedly called out of town, but paid

fees immediately upon his return when he found his assistant had failed to do so,
in violation
of his orders.).
18
Ibid.
1

2

35 F. Supp. 313 (E. D. Mich. 1940).

Id. at 314; cf. Farbwerke Vormals Meister L. & B. v. Diarsenal Co., Inc.,
et al., 21 F. (2d) 588 (W. D. N. Y. 1927); Comen v. Miller, 41 F. (2d) 292
(M. D. Pa. 1930) (It was held that there was nothing to show the contrary of a
bona fide intention).
21* Cisco et al. v. Looper, 236 Fed. 336 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); cf. Ben C.
Jones v. West Pub. Co., 270 Fed. 563 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921), writ dismissed,
Ben C. Jones v. West Pub. Co., 270 U. S. 665, 46 Sup. Ct. 208, 70 L. ed. 789
(1925), (Where a delay of five years six months in service supervenes, the running of the statute is not stopped by the filing of the complaint.).
2
Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F. (2d) 26, 28 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).

1945]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

years after the filing of the original complaint and more than four years
after the cause of action accrued.

From the second proposition expounded by the court in the principal case, the further question is presented as to when the amended
complaint will relate back to the time of original filing. It is generally
held that where an amendment introduces a new or different cause of
action and makes a new or different xlemand, not before introduced
or made in the pending suit, it does not relate back to the original

filing so as to stop the running of the statute; but where the amended
complaint merely varies or expands the allegations in the cause of action already propounded, it will relate back to the commencement of the
action, and the running of the statute of limitations is arrested at that
point.2 3* To determine whether a new cause of action is stated in the
amendment it has been stated that a ".

.

. fair test ...

is whether evi-

dence tending to support the facts alleged (in the amended complaint)
could have been introduced under the former pleadings."'24 Thus an
original complaint, alleging that the injury was caused due to defendant's manhole not being "flush" with the sidewalk, was not allowed
to be amended by the allegation that the accident was caused by negligently constructed corrugations on the manhole.2 5 Although other
strikingly similar tests have been propounded, 6* it would seem that
the one above stated is of greater value, since it is easier to apply to
"* Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Evans, 100 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938),
cert, den., 306 U. S. 665, 59 Sup. Ct. 790, 83 L. ed. 1061 (1938) ; Wabash Ry. Co.
v. Bridal, 94 F. (2d) 117, 121 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. den., 305 U. S. 602, 59
Sup. Ct. 63, 83 L. ed. 382 (1938), ("It is now the generally accepted rule, 'when
a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is
trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for
the statute of limitations do not exist, and * * * that a liberal rule should be applied."'); S. H. Kress & Co., Inc., v. Reaves, 85 F. (2d) 915, 916 (C. C. A. 4th,
1936), cert. den., 299 U. S.616, 57 Sup. Ct. 322. 81 L. ed. 454 (1937), (Amended
complaint held merely to amplify the original, where the original claimed damages
caused by defendant's excavations and amended complaint alleged further that the
excavations were done without ascertaining in advance the nature and character of
the ground) ; Factors & Finance Co., Inc., v. U. S.56 F. (2d) 902 (Ct. Cl. 1932),
cert. granted, 287 U. S. 582, 53 Sup. Ct. 16, 77 L. ed. 509 (1932), aff'd., 288 U. S.
89, 53 Sup. Ct. 287, 77 L. ed. 633 (1933); Hovland v. Farmers' State Bk. of
Christine, N. D., et al., 10 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (The allegations of
the original pleading must be sufficiently specific to enable the court to identify
the cause of action therein sought to be set up and to determine whether or not the
original and amended pleadings refer to the same cause of action.); Saylers et
al. v. U. S., 257 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) (Where the plaintiff, having two
causes of action, has stated but one of them in his original complaint, although
the amount demanded is large enough to cover both, an amendment setting up the
second cause of action will not relate back to the date of the original petition)
Dittgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 85 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1908).
" Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Evans, 100 F. (2d) 549, 552 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938),
cert. den., 306 U. S.665, 59 Sup. Ct. 790, 83 L. ed. 1061 (1939).
" Ibid.
,S0Saylers et al. v. U. S., 257 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) (Whether the
same evidence will support both; and whether a judgment against one will bar
the other.); Hall v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 157 Fed. 464 (C. C. N. D. Fla. 1907)
(Does the amendment introduce a new right or new matter?) ; Overfield v. Penn-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

each case as it arises. Thus it has been held that the cause of action
is not changed where the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff
sues under the authority and for the benefit of a third person, instead
of for his own benefit as evidenced by the original complaint.2 7* Then,
too, where the amended complaint changes the allegation of the capacity
in which the defendant is sued, and seeks application of different principles of law to the same facts upon which the former declaration, was
based, it does not introduce a new cause of action.2s* It is also generally recognized by the Federal courts, that a new cause of action is
not stated where the amendment sets forth the statute applicable to the
situation in replacement of an inapplicable statute pleaded in the origi29
nal complaint. *
Accordingly, by the process of "evolution," the "...
emphasis of
the courts has been shifted from a theory of law as the cause of action,
to the specified conduct of the -defendant upon which the plaintiff tries
to enforce his claim."' O* Thus by the application of Rule 15(c),31.
road Corp. et al., 39 F. Supp. 482, 485 (E. D. Pa. 1941) ("The important question
is whether or not the allowance of the amendments would work an injustice upon
any of :he parties.").

Z7 Middlesex Banking Co. v. Smith, 83 Fed. 133 (C. C. A. 5th, 1897). But cf.

Hall v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 157 Fed. 464 (C. C. N. D. Fla. 1907) (An amended
declaration changing the beneficiary of the action is in effect the bringing of a
new suit.).
"'* Clincbfield Ry. Co. v. Dunn, Admrx., 40 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930),
cert. den., 282 U. S. 860, 51 Sup. Ct. 34, 75 L. ed. 761 (1930), (Original complaint
alleged against defendant as corporate successor of Car., Clinchfield & Ohio Ry.
Co., whereas the amended complaint alleged defendant as "lessee" of said company.).
29*

Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 571, 575, 33 Sup. Ct. 135,

137, 57 L. ed. 355 (1913) ("The pleader was not required to refer to the federal
act, and the reference actually made to the Kansas Statute no more vitiated the
pleading than a reference to any other repealed statute would have done.") ; Williams v. Wm.B. Scaife & Sons Co., 227 Fed. 922 (D. N. J. 1915) ("The reference
in the first complaint to the New Jersey statute was mere surplusage, and no
more vitiated that pleading than a refernce to any other matter which was surplusage would have done. What has been done . . . is to eliminate . . . mere
surplusage.... ."). But cf. De Valle De Costa v. Southern Pac. Co., 167 Fed. 654
(C. C. D. Mass. 1909), cert. den., 217 U. S. 606, 30 Sup. Ct. 696, 54 L. ed. 900
(1909) (Where an amended declaration is based on a statute of another state, not
counted on in the original declaration, the suit was not commenced until the filing
of the amended declaration.); cf. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wyer 150 U. S. 285, 15
Sup. Ct. 377, 39 L. ed. 983 (1895) (Since the first petition proceeded under the
general law of master-servant, and the second petition asserted a right to recover
in derogation of that law, in consequence of the Kansas Statute, it was a departure from law to law, and therefore a different cause of action.).
So*White v. Holland Fur. Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S. D. Ohio 1939);
accord, Oil Well Supply Co. v. First Nat. Bk. of Winfield, Kan., 106 F. (2d)
399 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) (A departure from law to equity, or vice versa, resulting from amended petition, is not the test'as to whether a new cause of action
is stated.) ; Overfield v. Pennroad Corp. et al., 39 F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Pa. 1941)
(Controversies should be determined on the merits and not on procedural niceties,
if there will be no prejudice to the defendant.); cf. Midland Valley R. Co. v.
Jones, 115 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
32*28 U. S. C. A. §723c (1941), Rule 15(c) : "Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading."
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of the new Federal Rules, it is generally held that an amendment will
not state a new cause of action if the facts stated show ". . . substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction.., although
the form of liability asserted or the alleged incidents of the transaction
may be different.132 By application of this principle to the case at
hand, the result reached by the court seems unavoidable. The plaintiff
sought no relief against the partnership in his original complaint, but
both the original and amended complaints were directed against the
conduct of the individual defendant.
JAmEs

G. HUDsoN,

JR.

White Slave Traffic Act-Intent and Purpose within
the Meaning of the Act
Defendants operated a house of prostitution in Nebraska. They
took a vacation trip to Utah, carrying two prostitutes employed in their
house. It was undisputed that the trip was planned as a vacation, the
respective parties bearing individual expenses. Upon their return with
the defendants, the girls re-entered the defendants' employ. The United
States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the "White
Slave Traffic Act" by the defendants, for they did not transport the
girls with the intent or purpose to facilitate prostitution within the
meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the fact that the girls resumed their
immoral practice did not operate to, inject a retroactive illegal purpose
into the trip.' This case raises the interesting question: What constitutes "intent and purpose" within the meaning of the "White Slave
Traffic Act?"
The "Mann Act," most often called the "White Slave Traffic Act,"
provides that "Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to
be transported. . . in interstate commerce. . . any woman or girl for
the purposes of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce; entice; or compel
such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or engage in any other immoral practice ... shall be -deemed
guilty of a felony ...
."'
Thus, it appears from the reading of the
statute that there are two requisites to a conviction: (1) knowingly
transporting in interstate commerce (2) for the purpose of prostitution,
debauchery, or any other immoral purpose. 3 Under the statute there
is no distinction between "intent" and "purpose." If the transportation
12 Brown v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 443 (D. N. J. 1940); accord,
White v. Holland Fur. Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. Ohio, 1939).
1

Mortensen v. U. S.,

(1944).
2 36

-

U. S.

-

, 64 Sup. Ct. 1037,

-

L. ed.

STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. §398 (1927).
'U. S. v. Lewis, 110 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. den.., 310 U. S.
634, 60 Sup. Ct. 1077, 84 L. ed. 1404 (1940); Shama v. U. S., 94 F. (2d) 1
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938).

